In Defense of the Gadfly:

Why the Socratic Fallacy Fails by Caleb Brown

There is an argument against the Socratic method called the Socratic fallacy. In this short essay I will attempt to demonstrate how this critique of the first philosopher falls short. But first I wish to carry on in that Socratic tradition of steel manning the other's argument.

The Socratic fallacy is the mistake of supposing that a word cannot be used intelligibly unless we are in possession of an explicit definition of it.
— Warnock, G. J., Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy

Similarly, in Geach, P. T. (1965), “Assertion,” The Philosophical Review:

“Socrates, in Plato’s dialogues, constantly assumes that unless we can give a general definition of a term (e.g. ‘justice’), we do not understand it at all. This is a mistake now called the Socratic fallacy.”

Geach and Warnock are not mistaken in their claim that we can use a word without having to define or even know its essential nature. Its essence. For example I may say "yeah my red car is acting up, I think it’s the engine" to my mechanic. We may have different definitions of "car" or "engine" or even "red" I may be referring to a hot rod red and he may be thinking of a darker red. But he understands what I am saying because these words have familiar relations as British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein would say. This is an entirely correct view. The proponents of the Socratic fallacy take this position in favor of an epistemic humility about our ability to rationally come to the essence of a thing and define it.

The first objection on modes of communication

The issue with the first claim of the Socratic fallacy is that it makes a categorical error in assuming that there is only one mode of communication. That all communication is for the trading of information. When I say "red car" the exact essences or particulars are not needed for the exchange of information. The mechanic and I don’t have to sit down for a philosophical conversation on the essence of a car in order for him to understand the mechanical issues I am relating to him.

The mode of Socratic discourse is not that of simple informational exchange but an erotic (in the Greek sense) search for truth as truth not as truth in service of some other end. An erotic conversation is one in which there are at least three principal actors. The two in search and the truth they are searching for and the love of truth for its own sake. It’s analogous to the Trinity. As Fulton Sheen and others have said, “God is love but love requires the lover, the beloved and the love they share. God the Father loves God the Son as the Son loves the Father and the love that they share is the third” (the Holy Spirit)¹.

The Socratic fallacy makes a categorical error in assuming only one mode of communication. Now the proponents of the Socratic fallacy may argue that I am unfounded in arguing that there are different modes of communication. That ultimately all communication is the exchange of information and words have familiar relations so no essence can be derived through Socratic questioning.

But on the contrary I think we can all recognize at least some distinctions in conversation. For example "he took it down soft and slow" each of those words can refer to different things and have different familiar relations for a joke, a police report, or pillow talk.

The other way defenders of the Socratic fallacy may respond is to say that I am being unfair in my creation of a different mode for philosophy than regular conversation. That this is special pleading to defend Socrates. However it is perfectly reasonable and expected that an erotic conversation demands more of its speakers than an informational exchange in the same way the love of a spouse is more demanding than the like of a friend. We wouldn't say a wife demanding more attention from a husband when compared to a friend is “special pleading.”

Lastly the modern proponents of the Socratic fallacy might still argue that my defense of the gadfly of Athens falls short because essence-stating definitions are impossible to know. While the humility critique makes a good point after all there are some essences we’ll never fully grasp this side of Heaven like the essence of God that doesn’t mean we throw our hands up at everything. There’s a real difference between something being difficult to define and it being impossible. Take justice for example. We have reference points for what justice looks like. We’ve seen it done well, we’ve seen it perverted. Those reference points become anchors for language. From them we can observe, compare, and discuss until we start to uncover the essence of the thing.

In conclusion the Socratic fallacy makes its own fallacy in the form of a categorical error and while there is a point in which epistemic humility is justified it’s always at the limits of knowledge not the beginning.